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Abstract 
According to Schopenhauer, Kant’s arguments about the transcendental 
ideality of space and time can be extended to matter through the concept of 
causality and the principle of sufficient reason. In this article, I examine to 
what extent space, time and causality can be considered a priori concepts in 
the light of classical and modern physics. The concepts of matter and field, 
and their possible a priori fundaments, as stated by Schopenhauer, are thus 
revisited in a modern context. 
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Kant argued that space and time are given a priori as forms of intuition 
(Anschauungsformen), and “transcendental aesthetics cannot contain more 
than these two elements” (B58).1 Objects affect our senses as phenomena in 
space and time, and the phenomena are produced by a thing-in-itself which is 
not directly accessible to our senses.   
In The world as will and representation (WWR), Schopenhauer 
accepted Kant’s transcendental aesthetics, but reduced the categories of his 
transcendental logics to only one: causality. He argued that causality is 
another form of perception, though distinct from space and time, and that it is 
also given a priori, prior to all experience. Thus, he stood in opposition to 
empiricists such as Locke and Hume, who believed that our concept of 
causality follows from empirical experience, that is, it is given a posteriori. 
In his famous doctoral thesis, The fourfold root of the principle of 
sufficient reason (4R), Schopenhauer argued that causality is indissolubly 
associated to the principle of sufficient reason. He identified four roots of this 
principle, two of them being related to the perception of matter which he 
reasoned to be “through and through causality”. 
In previous works (Hacyan 2004, 2006), I pointed out that the concepts 
of space and time, as known in the macroscopic world, cannot be applied to 
the atomic world. The main argument was that the well-established existence 
of non-local effects in the quantum world is perfectly consistent with Kant´s 
thesis that space and time are forms of intuition, not to be found in the thing-
in-itself producing a phenomenon, but in its intuition.  
The aim of the present article is to examine if the concept of causality is 
given a priori, as claimed by Schopenhauer, and to analyze its relationship 
with the concepts of matter and mass in the light of classical and modern 
physics. In particular, I will consider the concept of field in modern physics, 
which has replaced the vague notion of substance as the substratum of matter 
in classical philosophy. 
 
1. Causality and sufficient reason 
                                                 
1 All references to Kant are to the Critique of Pure Reason. 
According to empiricism, we learn that a certain effect has such and such a 
cause only by experience. Schopenhauer, on the contrary, argued that 
causality is a form of understanding given a priori: the fact that we always 
associate a cause to an effect is an innate process. 
Consider, for instance, the fall of heavy bodies due to the action of gravity. If 
it were a purely empirical fact, it could occasionally happen that a body 
remained in levitation; that would be quite improbable but not fully 
impossible. After all, in another example, I may be buying a lottery ticket 
every week during many years without winning the big prize and that would 
be an empirical fact; but if I win someday, no law of nature would be violated.  
Of course, we are certain that bodies fall by the action of gravity. That is a law 
of nature. If, by any chance, it happened that a body did not fall, we will not 
be satisfied with the explanation that that is very improbable but not utterly 
impossible. Quite on the contrary, we would look for a reason for such a 
phenomenon; for instance, that the said body is lighter than air, that it is hold 
by invisible strings, that it is levitated by magnetic fields, etc. Actually, that is 
what science is about: given a new and unexpected phenomenon, one always 
looks for its cause.  
Consider a more realistic example: when Kamerlingh Onnes discovered that 
the electrical resistivity of mercury drops exactly to zero below a certain 
temperature, physicists spent several decades looking for an explanation of 
this entirely unexpected phenomenon; they finally found its (sufficient) reason 
in the realm of quantum mechanics. Another example is the actual situation in 
cosmology: the observational data fit quite well with the general relativistic 
model of the Universe, but only assuming the presence of an invisible “dark 
matter”, together with an even more mysterious cosmic acceleration. At 
present, most cosmologists believe that the model is correct and look for a 
direct evidence of dark matter. Other researchers have pointed out that 
gravitation may not behave as believed at very large scales. In either case, a 
sufficient reason is sought, whether in the form of a new kind of matter or a 
departure from the currently accepted theory of gravity. In the given 
examples, causality is closely related to the principle of sufficient reason: 
there is a reason for every phenomenon.  
In his doctoral thesis (4R), Schopenhauer identified as the first root of this 
principle the causal association of a sense stimuli to the phenomenon 
producing it. For instance, the physico-chemical stimuli produced by light on 
the retina and the transmission of this information to the brain through the 
optical nerve, requires a processing of this crude information by a certain form 
of understanding in order to yield an image of reality. In the modern language 
of computers, we could say that the brain has a software that processes the 
information and produces the images of the world. Anachronism apart, 
Schopenhauer’s point is that such a software is innate! We are born with it in 
our brain and learn to use it through experience. 
In Schopenhauer’s times, the perception of nature was basically through direct 
sense perceptions. It is mainly in the nineteenth century that scientist started to 
study the world with the massive support of sophisticated apparatuses 
designed to extricate its secrets to nature. Nowadays, physicists who study, 
say, subatomic particles do not see electrons, protons, Higgs bosons, etc. in a 
direct way: all they can do is to analyze a huge quantity of data collected by 
appropriately designed detectors and deduce, through a theoretical model, the 
processes that took place. Such an analysis must be based on some previously 
established theoretical model; if the model is wrong, contradictions appear 
between the collected data and their interpretations; otherwise, only the self-
consistency of the model is proved (in the case of the Standard Model of 
elementary particles, no inconsistency has been found so far). 
A century ago, Duhem (1914) discussed this important point in detail: 
“An experiment in Physics is not simply the observation of a 
phenomenon; it is, in addition, the theoretical interpretation of this 
phenomenon”  
Indeed, a layperson visiting a physicist’s laboratory would only see a set of 
apparatuses and monitors displaying graphs and numbers, but he/she will not 
guess what it is all about.  
Summing up, there are various steps in the process of understanding. In 
Kantian terms, there is a thing-in-itself that produces a phenomenon. This 
phenomenon is perceived either a direct stimulus in our sense organs which is 
further processed by the brain, or produces some data in an apparatus that are 
in turn processed according to a pre-established theoretical model. In the 
former case, the relation between cause and effect is provided by an internal 
innate “software” in the brain; in the latter case, use is made of an external 
“software” (including, nowadays, a real software in an artificial brain). In 
modern science, experimental results and their interpretations are necessarily 
mediated by a theory providing the causal relations between crude data and 
the theoretical description of a physical phenomenon. If some unexpected 
result or inconsistency appears, it must have a sufficient reason: it may be 
something yet unknown within a known theory (such as dark matter) or the 
need to modify the known theory (such as a modification of general 
relativity). 
 
2. Matter and causality 
Matter is quantified as mass, and mass can be determined empirically, either 
directly as weight or indirectly by the motion of a body. Accordingly, Kant 
did not consider mass as a pure form of intuition given a priori. On this point, 
he is quite explicit in stating that “the possibility of the synthesis of the 
predicate ‘weight’ with the concept of ‘body’… rests upon experience” (B12).  
Schopenhauer, however, in the third root of the principle of sufficient reason 
declared matter to be the “perceptibility of time and space, on the one hand, 
and causality that has become objective, on the other” (4R, §35), and 
furthermore: 
“The eternity of matter follows from the fact that the law of causality 
refers only to the states of bodies… it is by no means related to the 
existence of that which bears these states, and has been given the name 
of substance… Substance is permanent…” (4R, § 20) 
He further elaborated on this point in WWR, where, in particular, he 
postulated the concept of substance as the substratum of matter: 
 
Pure matter… alone constitutes the true and admissible content of the 
conception of substance, is causality itself, thought objectively, 
consequently as in space, and therefore filling it. Accordingly, the 
whole being of matter consists in acting. Only thus does it occupy space 
and last in time. It is through and through pure causality. (WWR Chap 
24) 
Hence the different manifestations of matter are accidents of the substance, or 
more precisely “a particular mode of action… in concreto.” (4R, § 21). On 
this point at least, Schopenhauer follows Locke, who divided qualities into 
primary and secondary, the latter being mutable. 
Now, causality manifests itself through matter. According to Schopenhauer, 
the third root of the principle of sufficient reason refers to matter as pure 
intuition. “Matter [is] the perceptibility of time and space, on the one hand, 
and causality that has become objective, on the other” (4R, § 35). This point is 
further elaborated in WWR, where Schopenhauer treats matter as if it were a 
third form of intuition. Accordingly, he included matter in parallel with space 
and time in his table of prædicabilia a priori, which are “all the fundamental 
truths rooted in our a priori knowledge of perception” (WWR Chap. IV of 
Vol. 2). In his own words: 
Matter… is not object but condition of experience, just as are space and 
time. This is why, in the accompanying table of our pure fundamental 
knowledge a priori, matter has been able to take the place of causality, 
and, together with space and time, figures as the third thing which is 
purely formal, and therefor inherent in our intellect. 
At present, some of the a priori truths in his table can be questioned as not 
making much sense in modern science, but in most cases their a priori nature 
is worth examining… even at the risk of falling into anachronisms!  
Thus, for instance, the first a priori truth states: “there is only one time… -- 
only one space… --only one Matter, and all different materials are different 
states of matter; as such it is called Substance”. Of course, the concept of 
substance used by ancient philosophers is nowadays completely outdated, but 
(as examined in the next sections) what Schopenhauer apparently had in mind 
could be closer to the modern concept of field in physics. This is consistent 
with his second a priori truth: “different matters are not so through substance 
but through accidents”, provided, of course, we interpret “accident” as a 
particular manifestation of physical fields.  
Then the third a priori truth, “time cannot be thought away… —space cannot 
be thought away… -- The annihilation of matter cannot be conceived, yet the 
annihilation of all its forms and qualities can” may be given a modern 
interpretation: matter and energy can transform into each other, but the total 
matter-energy cannot be annihilated (for instance, an electron and a positron 
produces two gamma rays, particles of pure energy). I will return to this point 
in section 3 below. 
The fourth a priori truth is: “Matter exists, i.e., acts in all the dimensions of 
space and throughout the whole length of time, and thus unites and thereby 
fills these two. In this consists the true nature of matter. It is therefore through 
and through causality.”  
The fifth a priori truth is that time, space and matter are each infinitely 
divisible. Of course, we now know about quarks, electrons and other 
elementary particles, but in physical theories these are described as point 
particles having no structure and therefore admitting no further division;2 if 
some structure were discovered in the future, more elementary constituents 
will be looked for.  
The sixth truth is that time, space and matter are homogeneous and form a 
continuum. This seems to contradict what we know about elementary 
particles, but the field of modern physics does form a continuum (see Section 
4 below).  
Finally, let us discuss at some length the eighteenth truth: 
 
Time is not measurable directly through itself, but only indirectly 
through motion, which is in space and time simultaneously; thus time is 
measured by the motion of the sun and of the clock. 
 
Space is measurable directly through itself, and indirectly through 
motion, which is in time and space simultaneously; thus, for example, 
an hour’s walk, and the distance of the fixed stars expressed as so many 
light years. 
 
Matter as such (mass) is measurable, i.e., determinable according to its 
quantity, only indirectly, thus only through the magnitude of the motion, 
which it receives and imparts by being repelled or attracted. 
Time was measured in the past with the periodic motion of celestial bodies, 
and nowadays it is measured with the periodic vibrations of atoms. Space is 
presently measured in terms of the distance covered by light in a (well 
defined) unit of time. As for mass, its quantification is more problematic; the 
previous eighth a priori truth states that “by reason of matter we weight”, but 
it has been considerably more difficult to find a standard of mass in terms of 
purely natural constants.3 
                                                 
2 “Superstrings” have some structure, but in an abstract mathematical space. 
3 Hopefully, the Sèvres standard will be soon replaced by an atomic standard based on the value of the Planck 
constant. 
 3. Space, time and mass 
There are several definitions of mass in physics textbooks. It is usually 
defined as the “quantity of matter”, albeit it is never specified how such a 
quantity can be measured. Moreover, there is a general confusion between 
mass and weight. We now know that weight, though related to mass, is a 
manifestation of the gravitational force and vanishes in outer space. 
Obviously, this was unknown in antiquity, and there was even confusion 
between size and weight due to the fact that bigger bodies are usually heavier 
than smaller ones (Jammer 1961). 
In the Principia, Newton defined mass as the “quantity of matter”, which is 
“the measure of the same [matter], arising from its density and bulk 
conjointly.” It appears, therefore, that for Newton density was a more primary 
concept than mass. As for Newton’s second law, its usual textbook form, 
“force equals mass times acceleration”, is due mainly to Euler. Euler argued 
that the primary concept should be force and not mass: for how can mass be 
measured without observing the motion of a body experiencing a certain force 
of known magnitude? Accordingly, Euler postulated mass as the ratio of force 
to the acceleration it produces. 
However, it is not obvious that force should be a primary concept. Jammer 
(1961) remarked that, due to the new positivistic attitude: “What once, in 
Newtonian physics, played a central role was now regarded as an obscure 
metaphysical notion that has to be banished from science.” Is it then possible 
to measure mass without referring to force (or gravity)? Ernst Mach (1893) 
conceived an idealized scheme to deduce the mass of two bodies from their 
motions in a collision, but the method is not at all practical. 
Summing up, while the concept of acceleration, which is given in terms of 
space and time, is intuitively clear, it is not clear that force or mass should be 
primary concepts. One can either define mass as the ratio between force and 
acceleration, or define force as the product of mass and acceleration.  
We are therefore faced with the fact that mass can be measured only through 
motion (or equilibrium) in space and time, as anticipated by Schopenhauer in 
its table of prædicabilia. 
 
4. Substance and matter 
Classical philosophers called “substance” the underlying and permanent 
element of the world. Kant though that it is necessary to “presuppose its 
existence throughout all time” (B 228), since “the unity of experience would 
never be possible if we were willing to allow that new things, that is, new 
substances, could come into existence” (B 229). 
Kant described the principle of conservation of substance as an “analogy of 
experience”. Regarding mass, he gave the example of how a philosopher 
would determine the weight of smoke: “Subtract from the weight of the wood 
burnt the weight of the ashes which are left over, and you have the weight of 
the smoke”. This, however, as Kant pointed out, is based on the 
presupposition that “matter (substance) does not vanish, but only suffers an 
alteration of form” (B 228). This should be known a priori, following from a 
principle of permanence, even though it can be experimentally confirmed or 
disconfirmed a posteriori. If disconfirmed, some sufficient reason for the 
discrepancy will be looked for without abandoning the general principle.  
 
Now, as for a principle of permanence, physicists would rather refer to the 
conservation of mass-energy. The fundamental concept of energy, together 
with its conservation law, appeared in physical theories in the middle of the 
nineteenth century. It is only then that physicist realized that there must be, 
besides matter, some conserved quantities in the physical world. From then 
onwards, the concept of force, which seemed to be so fundamental, was 
gradually substituted by the more abstract but mathematically well-defined 
concept of energy. Furthermore, when Einstein proved the equivalence 
between mass and energy, it became clear that what is conserved is not mass 
or energy separately, as previously believed, but mass and energy together (for 
instance, it was realized that an atomic nucleus has slightly less mass than the 
sum of its constituents, the difference being the binding energy).  
Although the conservation of mass-energy is presently well accepted, it is 
nevertheless an empirical principle of physics, and, as such, Kant would say 
that it lacks “strict universality and apodictic certainty”. An historical curiosity 
may illustrate this point: When it was found out that energy was apparently 
not conserved in nuclear beta decays, no less an authority than Niels Bohr 
proposed the daring hypothesis that the conservation of energy is a statistical 
principle only and does not apply at the atomic level. The alternative proposed 
by Wolfgang Pauli was to keep this principle at the expense of postulating the 
existence of an unknown particle, invisible and intractable, which would be 
produced in a beta decay and carry the missing energy away. Thus, in a sense, 
Pauli was following the method of Kant’s hypothetical philosopher: instead of 
smoke, he weighted an even more elusive object, which turned out to be the 
neutrino. At the time of this discussion, both alternatives seemed equally 
convincing, but experiments finally confirmed Pauli’s hypothesis.  
Of course, it would be an anachronism to interpret matter and substance as 
understood by classical philosophers in terms of modern physical concepts. 
But the important point I want to stress is that the existence of something 
acting as the universal substratum of all material phenomena must be a belief 
a priori, since it cannot be proved empirically. A conservation law is always 
wanted, even though it may evolve according to newly discovered facts. And 
as for the substratum, something equivalent can be found in the concept of 
field in modern physics. 
 
5. Matter and field 
 
A fundamental concept forged by physicists was that of field. In this respect, 
Einstein noted that (Jammer 1954):  
The concept of the material objects was gradually replaced as the 
fundamental concept of physics by that of the field. Under the influence 
of the ideas of Faraday and Maxwell the notion developed that the 
whole of physical reality could perhaps be represented as a field whose 
components depend on four space-time parameters. 
Material objects interact between themselves in different ways and it is the 
most important purpose of physics to explain their interactions. As mentioned 
by Einstein, this was achieved in the nineteenth century for electromagnetism 
with the concept of field. Another force of nature, gravity, can also be 
described in terms of a field, as in general relativity (the gravitational field can 
be interpreted as a Riemannian space, but that is another story).  
With the discovery of the atomic world and the advent of quantum mechanics, 
it was possible to describe nuclear processes with a quantum theory of fields. 
Quantum Field Theory (QFT) proved to be an extremely successful theory of 
all electromagnetic and nuclear processes. In this theory, the elementary 
particles that constitute matter are interpreted as vibrations of a field; the 
energy of these vibrations is quantized, and each quantum of energy is 
identified with a subatomic particle. The so called Standard Model of 
elementary particles, which is based on QFT, has been confirmed in all 
possible ways and provides an accurate descriptions of nature at the atomic 
and subatomic level… even though its success does not cease to surprise 
physicists! 
Basically, QFT is a mathematical theory that describes various kinds of fields 
as functions of space and time, which are supposed to form a continuum.4 
Space and time, the two forms of intuition according to Kant, are therefore the 
primary and fundamental concepts of QFT, and the field itself, as any physical 
quantity, is a function of variables and parameters with units of length, time 
and mass (or energy).  
 
6. On mathematics 
 
Schopenhauer was not fond of mathematics. Without denying its practical use, 
he was convinced that mathematics could only yield a quantitative description 
of the material world, but could never provide an understanding of its causal 
relations. “Where calculating begins, understanding ends” was his statement 
on this matter (4R, §21; see also Chap. XIII of WWR). His view may seem to 
be anachronic nowadays, but it must be recalled that his dislike of 
mathematics was shared by many intellectuals of his time, who longed for a 
direct perception of nature and its laws without the intermediary of abstract 
concepts. Let us recall that even Isaac Newton was criticized in his time for 
having “only” described the motion of planets, without explaining the real 
cause of gravity. Goethe, a contemporary much-admired by Schopenhauer, 
was a strong critic of abstractions in the description of nature; they may be 
useful, he held, but “it does not occur to the architect to pass off his palaces as 
mountain sides and forests” (cited by Heisenberg 1990). Even among 
physicists, the case of Michael Faraday is noteworthy: he performed many 
crucial experiments that were the basis of a full theory of electromagnetism, 
but his knowledge of mathematics was quite limited and he deliberately 
avoided mathematical description in the treaties he authored. 
 
                                                 
4 There have been some theoretical intents to quantize space and time, buy without clear results. 
Nowadays, we are accustomed to the enormous success of mathematics in 
describing physical phenomena. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer was right in a 
certain sense; indeed, a mathematical description yields only numbers, but not 
a real understanding. Quantum mechanics is an excellent example: it is based 
entirely on abstract concepts, such as wave function, evolution operators, 
probability amplitudes, collapse, spin, etc., and it has proved to be the most 
precise description of physical phenomena. Yet, a description in terms of 
known concepts, such as particle, space and time, has proved to be impossible; 
any attempt to “explain” quantum mechanics has inevitably led to paradoxes. 
 
Why is mathematics so effective is a great mystery of modern physics. Indeed, 
its effectiveness is quite unreasonable, as Eugene Wigner (1960) has well 
pointed out. In conclusion, we could paraphrase Schopenhauer and assert that 
“where understanding ends, calculating begins…but it may go very far!”. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
All equations of physics and all measurements, in any system of units, involve 
space, time, and mass (or equivalently energy), and, accordingly, the 
irreducible elements of any system of units in physics are the standards of 
length, time and mass. The relation between space and time became manifest 
with the theory of relativity: the connection between these two forms of 
perceptions is given by the velocity of light (in vacuum), which is a universal 
constant of nature. A further connection with mass was revealed when Max 
Planck discovered the quantization of energy. Energy is related to the 
frequency of oscillation of light through the Planck constant, the fundamental 
constant of the quantum world. In summary, Planck constant and the velocity 
of light relate mass, space and time among themselves.  
Causality is a fundamental part of physics (not to be confused with 
determinism). In the presently accepted interpretation of quantum mechanics: 
there is a wave function that describes all the possible states of a particular 
physical system, and the intervention of an observer causes its collapse to a 
wave-function describing a single state. Accordingly, there is a sufficient 
reason for the “collapse of the wave-function”. In general, every effect must 
have a sufficient reason, to be investigated and discovered. Unexpected results 
are the most interesting ones, since they open the way to the discovery of new 
phenomena.  
Finally, anachronisms apart, the argument is that we need an a priori concept 
for the substratum of the world. Like the substance of classical philosophers, 
the field in modern physics is the ultimate underlying substance of the world. 
It is given in terms of space and time, and generates the mass of the subatomic 
particles. Thus, it can be interpreted as the sufficient reason for the existence 
of matter. 
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